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THE BROODING OMNIPRESENCE OF THE FEDERAL
COMMON LAW: THE EVISCERATION OF THE
CONTROLLING PERSONS PROVISIONS OF
THE FEDERAL SECURITIES ACTS
"The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but
the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can
be identified; although some decisions with which I have disagreed
seem to me to have forgotten the fact. "*
INTRODUCTION
Section 20(a)I of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act)2
imposes liability on any person who controls another person who
commits a violation of any section of the Act. The section is modeled
on the provision 3 of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) 4 that imposes
liability upon persons controlling those who violate the 1933 Act.
These sections have been used to determine the liability of brokerage
firms for securities law violations committed by their registered repre-
* Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing).
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1976). The section provides: "Every person who, directly
or indirectly, controls any person liable under any provision of this chapter or of any
rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the
same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person
is liable, unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or
indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action." Id.
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
3. Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1115 (5th
Cir. 1980); Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656, 673 (5th Cir. 1980); SEC v. Management
Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 812 (2d Cir. 1975); Stock Exchange Practices: Hear-
ings on S. Res. 84, S. Res. 56, and S. Res. 97 Before the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6571 (1934) (statement of Thomas G.
Corcoran) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]; see Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277,
1299 (2d Cir. 1973); Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co., 382 F.2d 689, 697 (9th
Cir. 1967), cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968). The relevant section provides:
"Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, or who,
pursuant to or in connection with an agreement or understanding with one or more
other persons by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, controls any
person liable under sections 77k or 771 of this title, shall also be liable jointly and
severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person to
whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person had no knowl-
edge of or reasonable ground to believe in the existence of the facts by reason of
which the liability of the controlled person is alleged to exist." 15 U.S.C. § 77o
(1976).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1976).
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sentatives. While this situation has been the principal source of
litigation, these sections have also been used to determine the liability
of other types of employers and principals who exercise control over
those who violate the sections.6
In recent years, a number of federal courts have taken the position
that secondary liability for the securities law violations of employees
may also be imposed on employers through the application of general-
ized common-law principles of agency and respondeat superior.7
Other courts have maintained that the controlling persons sections of
the acts are the exclusive means of imposing secondary liability on
5. Henricksen v. Henricksen, 640 F.2d 880, 884 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 50
U.S.L.W. 3462 (U.S. Dec. 8, 1981); Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce
Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1118 (5th Cir. 1980); Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629
F.2d 705, 712 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980); Carpenter v. Harris,
Upham & Co., 594 F.2d 388, 390 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979);
Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 596 (3d Cir. 1976); Holoway v. Howerdd,
536 F.2d 690, 692 (6th Cir. 1976); SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 42 (2d
Cir. 1976); SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 812 (2d Cir. 1975);
Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1052 (7th Cir. 1974); Douglass v. Glenn E.
Hinton Invs., Inc., 440 F.2d 912, 913-14 (9th Cir. 1971); Kamen & Co. v. Paul H.
Aschkar & Co., 382 F.2d 689, 691 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 801
(1968); Haynes v. Anderson & Strudwick, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1303, 1311 (E.D. Va.
1981); Kravitz v. Pressman, Frohlich & Frost, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 203, 212 (D. Mass.
1978); Barthe v. Rizzo, 384 F. Supp. 1063, 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); SEC v. Lum's,
Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046, 1064 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 297
F. Supp. 1165, 1172 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F.
Supp. 417, 430 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified on other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir.
1970).
6. Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 179 (3d Cir. 1981) (accounting
firm for its accountants); Could v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761,
778-79 (3d Cir. 1976) (corporation for its directors); Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d
1129, 1132 (9th Cir.) (newspaper for a financial columnist), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1025 (1975); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973) (corporation
for its director); SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981, 986 (7th Cir.) (brokerage firm
for its president), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972); Richardson v. MacArthur, 451
F.2d 35, 41 (10th Cir. 1971) (corporation for its employee); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d
718, 739 (8th Cir. 1967) (directors-shareholders for party acting on their behalf),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Gordon v. Burr, 366 F. Supp. 156, 167 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) (corporation for its president), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 506 F.2d 1080 (2d
Cir. 1974).
7. Four circuits follow this rule. Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce
Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1118 (5th Cir. 1980); Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629
F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980); Holoway v. Howerdd,
536 F.2d 690, 694 (6th Cir. 1976); Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1052 (7th
Cir. 1974). The Third Circuit, which long held that the statutory provisions are
exclusive, appears to have reversed its leading case, Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527
F.2d 880, 884-86 (3d Cir. 1975), or at least drastically limited it by creating a special
duty exception. Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 184-85 (3d Cir. 1981).
The First Circuit has not addressed this issue, but one district court in that circuit has
stated that both theories of liability are appropriate. Kravitz v. Pressman, Frohlich &
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employers under the securities acts.8 This difference in statutory
construction is of great significance because section 20(a) of the 1934
Act grants a defense to controlling persons who demonstrate that they
have acted in "good faith." Section 15 of the 1933 Act contains a
similar provision.'0 There is, however, no such defense available in
an action based on common-law principles of agency and respondeat
superior," under which the inquiry is, respectively, into the scope of
Frost, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 203, 214 (D. Mass. 1978). It is clear that the common law
being applied is federal, not state, law. See infra note 82.
8. This is the rule in the Ninth Circuit. Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129,
1132-33 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975). The Fourth Circuit, in which
the idea originated that employers might be held liable under common-law theories
of liability, Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 297 F. Supp. 1165, 1212-13 (D. Md.
1968), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 916 (1974), appears to have shifted to the position that statutory liability is
exclusive. See Carpenter v. Harris, Upham & Co., 594 F.2d 388, 394 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979). A well-reasoned district court decision in that circuit
has construed Carpenter in that manner. Haynes v. Anderson & Strudwick, Inc., 508
F. Supp. 1303, 1312 (E.D. Va. 1981). The position of the Tenth Circuit appears to be
that the statutory provisions are exclusive. See Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d
35, 41-42 (10th Cir. 1971). The Eighth Circuit has assumed, without deciding, that
the statutory provisions are exclusive. See Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 738 (8th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1976), construed in Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S.
Co., 535 F.2d 761, 778-79 (3d Cir. 1976); Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co.,
382 F.2d 689, 697 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968); Barthe v.
Rizzo, 384 F. Supp. 1063, 1070 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); accord Note, The Burden of
Control: Derivative Liability Under Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 48 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1019, 1025-28 (1973). To successfully mount a good faith
defense a broker must show that he has met his duty "to establish, maintain [and]
diligently enforce a proper system of supervision and control." G.A. Thompson &
Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 958-59 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting DelPorte v. Shearson
Hammill & Co., 548 F.2d 1149, 1154 (5th Cir. 1977)); accord Carpenter v. Harris,
Upham & Co., 594 F.2d 388; 394 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979):
Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129, 1134-35 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1025 (1975).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1976); see supra note 3. While § 20(a) phrases the defense as
one of good faith, the § 15 defense is premised on a defendant's lack of "knowledge of
or reasonable ground to believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which the
liability of the controlled person is alleged to exist." 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1976). Professor
Loss is of the opinion that the § 15 defense provides controlling persons with a
"seemingly readier defense" than § 20(a). 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1747 (2d
ed. 1961).
11. Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1117-18
(5th Cir. 1980); Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980); Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d
761, 778-79 (3d Cir. 1976); Jackson v. Bache & Co., 381 F. Supp. 71, 95 (N.D. Cal.
1974); Gordon v. Burr, 366 F. Supp. 156, 167-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 506 F.2d 1080 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046,
1061-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud
Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and
Contribution, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev. 597, 607-08 (1972).
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the agent's authority12 or the servant's employment.' 3  As a result, an
employer who might have escaped liability in an action based solely
on the securities statutes may be found liable through application of
common-law principles.' 4
This Note argues that the legislative history of the 1933 Act and the
1934 Act indicates that the sections were intended to include employ-
ment relationships. This Note then concludes that because employ-
ment relationships are covered by the statute, the judicial application
of generalized common-law principles to actions under the securities
statutes is an unjustified creation of federal common law.
I. THE SCOPE OF THE CONTROLLING PERSONS SECTIONS
The securities acts are broad and comprehensive federal legisla-
tion' s representing the intent of Congress to regulate the securities
industry.1" The Acts are specific in their provisions for methods of
imposing secondary liability on those who control violators of the
Acts.' 7 Secondary liability is thus typically imposed upon majority
shareholders for actions of their "dummy" directors, 18 employers for
conduct of their employees,' such as in the brokerage-firm context,20
12. Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1052 (7th Cir. 1974); SEC v. First Sec.
Co., 463 F.2d 981, 985-86 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972); Restatement
(Second) of Agency §§ 215, 261 (1958).
13. Lewis v. Walston & Co., 487 F.2d 617, 623 (5th Cir. 1973); Restatement
(Second) of Agency §§ 228-37 (1958).
14. See, e.g., Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980); Holloway v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690, 695-96 (6th
Cir. 1976); Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 94 n.22 (5th Cir. 1975); Kra%itz
v. Pressman, Frohlich & Frost, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 203, 214 (D. Mass. 1978); Jackson
v. Bache & Co., 381 F. Supp. 71, 95 (N.D. Cal. 1974); SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F.
Supp. 1046, 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
15. Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126, 1132 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 101 S. Ct. 999
(1981); Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1286 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); Brief for the SEC as amicus curiae at 12, Paul H.
Aschkar & Co. v. Kamen & Co., 393 U.S. 801 (1968) (dismissing cert.) [hereinafter
cited as SEC Brief].
16. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976); United Housing
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975); El Khadem v. Equity Sec.
Corp., 494 F.2d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974); Felts v.
National Account Sys. Ass'n, 469 F. Supp. 54, 63 (N.D. Miss. 1978); H.R. Rep. No.
85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1933); see Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 580
(2d Cir. 1979); Folk, Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts: The
BarChris Case, 55 Va. L. Rev. 1, 17 (1969); Knauss, A Reappraisal of the Role of
Disclosure, 62 Mich. L. Rev. 607, 607 (1964).
17. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
18. E.g., Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 778-79 (3d Cir.
1976); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1279 (2d Cir. 1973).
19. E.g., Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 179 (3d Cir. 1981); Zweig
v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129, 1131-33 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025
(1975); Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35, 41-42 (10th Cir. 1971); Gordon v.
1981]
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and generally upon whomever can be said to control others, such as
close family members. 2'
A. Statutory Construction
The development of the line of cases that permits actions based on
both common-law principles and the securities acts22 found its genesis
in the assertion that the controlling persons provisions do not cover the
"ordinary employer-employee context."' 23  Rather, it was argued,
they were "designed to reach situations in which there are technical
legal barriers between the persons in fact responsible for violations of
the securities acts and those injured by the violations. ' 24 Under this
view, the liability of employers, therefore, should be determined "un-
der the antifraud provisions themselves. '2 5  Because under the statu-
tory scheme the antifraud provisions cannot be applied to impose
secondary liability without resort to the controlling persons provi-
Burr, 366 F. Supp. 156, 167-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 506 F.2d
1080 (2d Cir. 1974).
20. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
21. See Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 729, 739 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 951 (1968).
22. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
23. SEC Brief, supra note 15, at 12. The idea that principles of agency may be
used to impose secondary liability under the securities acts can be traced back to the
view of legislative history taken in a brief filed by the SEC as amicus curiae in Kamen
& Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co., 382 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. dismissed, 393
U.S. 801 (1968). In Kamen, two registered representatives of the brokerage firm,
Kamen & Co., engaged in a fraudulent scheme to use their positions at Kamen to
create a false impression of activity in the trading of a worthless stock. 382 F.2d at
691-92. The plaintiff brokerage firm, Paul H. Aschkar & Co., acquired some of the
worthless stock for its customers. The customers, however, became aware of the
fraud and refused to pay for the stock. Id. at 692-93. Aschkar sued Kamen under the
securities acts as a controlling person and also under California common law, with
federal jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship, as a principal liable for the
misrepresentations of its agents. Id. at 693. The court held that Kamen was not liable
under the securities acts for its representatives' actions as the firm had acted in good
faith. Id. at 697. It also held that Kamen was not liable at common law as Its
representatives had neither actual nor ostensible authority to engage in the fraud and
the conduct of the representatives was such that the plaintiff should have been on
notice of the irregularities in the transaction. Id. at 693-94. The unsuccessful plaintiff
applied for a writ of certiorari, which was granted. Paul H. Aschkar & Co. v. Kamen
& Co., 390 U.S. 942 (1968). It was at this point that the SEC filed a brief as amicus
curiae. The brief took the novel position that principles of agency were relevant to
the case as a means of ascertaining liability under the securities laws. SEC Brief,
supra, at 12-13. The question raised by the SEC Brief was never resolved as certiorari
was dismissed on the case. Paul H. Aschkar & Co. v. Kamen & Co., 393 U.S. 801
(1968).
24. SEC Brief, supra note 15, at 12 ("technical legal barriers" referred to the use
of "dummy" directors to shield controlling shareholders).
25. Id. at 13. See Comment, Rule 10b-5 and Vicarious Liability Based on Re-
spondeat Superior, 69 Cal. L. Rev. 1513 (1981), which argues a "recognized connec-
tion" exists between § 10(b) and the common law of deceit, and asserts nonexclusivity
of § 20(a). Id. at 1523-24. Creation of a rather "inelegant" bifurcation of theories of
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sions,2 6 this rationale constitutes an improper application of the anti-
fraud provisions by means of common-law agency principles.
The first decision2 7 to so employ agency principles was Johns
Hopkins University v. Hutton.2 8 The court in Johns Hopkins cited
several legislative materials29 for its disbelief that "[s]ection 15 ...
secondary liability based upon a questionable symbiosis of statutory and common
law, see id. at 1530-31, is a needless complication and derives from a misinterpreta-
tion of congressional intent. See infra pt. I(B).
26. Legal entities other than natural persons are included in the definitions of
"person" in both Acts. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(2) (1976); Id. § 78c(a)(9); SEC Brief, supra
note 15, at 12-13 & n.7. It has been argued that, because a corporation or partner-
ship can only act through its agents, the acts of agents in violation of the antifraud
provisions are the acts of their principals. SEC Brief, supra, at 12 n.7. The term
person," however, is also used throughout the controlling persons provisions. See
supra notes 1 & 3 and accompanying text. There is no separate definition of "control-
ling person" in the definitional sections of the Acts or any limitation of the words to
natural persons. Thus, there is no justification for reading the word, "person,"
expansively in the antifraud provisions and reading it restrictively in the controlling
persons provisions. In fact courts have held corporations to be subject to § 20(a), e.g.,
Henricksen v. Henricksen, 640 F.2d 880, 884-885 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 50
U.S.L.W. 3462 (U.S. Dec. 8, 1981); Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce
Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1120 (5th Cir. 1980); Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629
F.2d 705, 712 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980), as well as to § 15. E.g.,
Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co., 382 F.2d 689, 697 (9th Cir. 1967), cert.
dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968). Moreover, the legislative history of the controlling
persons provisions makes clear that a broad range of "persons" are within their scope.
See infra pt. I(B).
27. Prior to 1968, courts routinely used the controlling persons sections to impose
secondary liability. E.g., Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co., 382 F.2d 689, 691
(9th Cir. 1967), cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968); Hawkins v. Merrill, Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85 F. Supp. 104, 123 (W.D. Ark. 1949).
28. 297 F. Supp. 1165, 1212-13 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 422
F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974).
29. Id. at 1211 n.27. First, the opinion cited the House Conference Report on the
1933 Act. H.R. Rep. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1933). This report reads: "The
Senate amendment contained provisions referred to as 'dummy provisions' which
were calculated to place liability upon a person who acted through another, irrespec-
tive of whether a direct agency relationship existed but dependent upon the actual
control exercised by the one party over the other." Id. (emphasis added). This
language does not exclude the ordinary employment situation. The next citation to
legislative history is to a very general paraphrase of the 1934 Act's controlling persons
section and its good faith provision. H.R. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 37, 42
(1934). The court vent on to cite a House report that contains a draft of the
controlling persons provision of the 1934 Act along with an explanation of control
that very clearly goes against the interpretation of the section that the court adopted.
This report reads: "It was thought undesirable to attempt to define [control]. It
would be difficult if not impossible to enumerate or to anticipate the man), ways in
which actual control may be exerted. A few examples of the methods used are stock
ownership, lease, contract, and agency." H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 26
(1934) (emphasis added). The plain meaning of the report's language is that agency
relationships are among those which fall within the definition of control. The next
citation is to the SEC Brief which had preceeded Johns Hopkins in developing this
interpretation of legislative history. SEC Brief, supra note 15, at 13-17. Finally, the
court cited an article in the Congressional Record that advocated passage of the
1981]
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relating to 'controlling' persons applies to the employer (brokerage
house)-employee relationship." 30 Accordingly, liability was found
to be governed solely by the common law. 31 The Johns Hopkins
conclusion that an employer may be liable for the misconduct of its
employees under agency principles was adopted in SEC v. Manage-
ment Dynamics, Inc.32  The court in Management Dynamics relied
on legislative materials cited by the Johns Hopkins court,3 3 but con-
ducted an independent examination of the legislative history.34 Specif-
ically cited was a comment by one of the principal architects of
section 20(a) that the section's purpose was "to prevent evasion of the
provisions of the section by organizing dummies who will undertake
the actual things forbidden by the section."' 3 Disclaiming any af-
firmative decision with respect to the application of the controlling
persons provisions to employer-employee situations,30 the court deter-
mined that sections 15 and 20(a) were not preemptive of common-law
principles. 37 The holding was limited to its facts, using precedent
that applied agency law to the brokerage context. 38
In'Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn,39 the Second Circuit ac-
knowledged that section 20(a) was broad enough to cover employer
liability40 but, citing Management Dynamics, held that agency princi-
ples were not displaced by the statutory scheme. 4' In concluding that
section 20(a) liability supplemented, rather than supplanted, tradi-
tional common-law remedies, Marbury Management implicitly
adopted the Management Dynamics rationale that the controlling
persons sections were aimed at situations in which there are technical
proposed legislation, because among its other advantages, it would prevent "dummy
directors" from insulating controlling shareholders from liability. Flexner, The Fight
on the Securities Acts, 78 Cong. Rec. 523, 529 (1934) [hereinafter cited as The Fight].
30. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 297 F. Supp. 1165, 1211 (D. Md. 1968),
af-'d in part, rev'd in part, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916
(1974).
31. Id. at 1212.
32. 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975).
33. Id. at 812; see supra note 29.
34. 515 F.2d at 812.
35. Id. (quoting Hearings, supra note 3, at 6571 (statement of Thomas G.
Corcoran)).
36. Id. at 812-13.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 813.
39. 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980).
40. Id. at 712. The complaint presented to the district court alleged only an
aiding and abetting claim, and the district court confined its opinion to that claim.
Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 470 F. Supp. 509, 515 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
The appellate court held, however, that the record fairly presented a claim under
theories of respondeat superior and statutory controlling person liability. 629 F.2d at
712.
41. 629 F.2d at 716.
[Vol. 50
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barriers to imposition of liability, such as in the case of dummy
directors.42
While Johns Hopkins, Management Dynamics and their progeny 43
are correct in identifying one of the concerns of the drafters of sections
15 and 20(a) 44 they are incorrect in mistaking that concern as the
limit of the provisions' respective scope.45  An examination of the
legislative history of section 15 of the 1933 Act and section 20(a) of the
1934 Act shows that they were meant to include employment relation-
ships.
B. Legislative History
The original draft of section 15 of the 1933 Act would have imposed
liability on those who committed violations of the Acts through so-
called "dummies." 46 The definition of a "dummy" was extremely
broad and included any person who is "under moral or legal obliga-
tion to act therein in accordance with the direction of another." 47 In
the final draft, the word "dummy" was dropped, and the section was
rewritten to impose liability upon a person who exercises control over
a violator of the Act by means of "stock ownership, agency, or other-
wise."' 48 The words "stock ownership" were clearly addressed to the
problem of dummy directors, members of corporate boards of direc-
tors who might violate the Act at the direction of the majority share-
holders of a corporation. 4  The drafters were particularly concerned
that such shareholders not escape liability by relying on the right of
directors to act independently. 50
42. Id.
43. In recent years, many courts have concluded under varying rationales that
both agency principles and statutory provisions may be used to establish an em-
ployer's liability without examining the original contention that the former are
available because the latter are not. Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce
Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1116-19 (5th Cir. 1980) (it is the rule in other circuits);
Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 714-15 (2d Cir.) (same), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980); Holloway v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690, 694-95 (6th Cir.
1976) (same); Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1051-52 (7th Cir. 1974)
(assuming matter is settled law); Armstrong, Jones & Co. v. SEC, 421 F.2d 359, 362
(6th Cir.) (it is opinion of SEC), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970); Kravitz v.
Pressman, Frohlich & Frost, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 203, 214 (D. Mass. 1978) (public
policy of protecting investors).
44. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
45. See infra text accompanying notes 51-54.
46. S. Res. 875, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 77 Cong. Rec. 2982 (1933).
47. Id. at 2979.
48. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1976).
49. See, e.g., Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 778-79 (3d
Cir. 1976); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973).
50. S. Res. No. 875, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 77 Cong. Rec. 2982 (1933); SEC Brief,
supra note 15, at 12-13; The Fight, supra note 29, at 529; see S. Rep. No. 47, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933).
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Section 15, however, goes beyond its resolution of the "stock owner-
ship" problem and imposes liability on those whose control derives
from an agency relationship51 or, as evidenced by the use of the
sweeping term "otherwise," 52 those whose control derives from any
other means. Congress was concerned that the use of "agency" might
be construed as limiting the application of the section to parties who
would have been principals at common law. 3 This explains the
inclusion of "otherwise" in the statute. Thus, properly construed, the
section imposes liability on: (1) majority shareholders for the statutory
violations of dummy directors; (2) persons who at common law would
be considered principals; and (3) any other person in control of an-
other in a manner not directly addressed by the statute. 4
The drafters of the 1934 Act intended to create a broad secondary
liability for violations of that Act equivalent to section 15 liability for
violators of the 1933 Act. 5 Legislative history indicates that section
20(a) of the 1934 Act was consciously modeled on section 15 of the
1933 Act. 56 Congress had the same concern in drafting the section as
had the Congress that passed the 1933 Act. It wished to provide for
secondary liability in the statute without including any language in
the provision that might be construed as narrowing its application. 7
Congress also decided not to define "control" to prevent any definition
from being construed as a limitation on liability.58 Consistent with
this intent, the more general phrase "directly or indirectly"50 was
substituted for the phrase "by or through stock ownership, agency, or
otherwise '6 0 used in the 1933 Act. Thus, the recurring theme of the
legislative history of section 20(a) of the 1934 Act, like that of section
15 of the 1933 Act, is that the section's scope is intended to be broad.
It is axiomatic that the relationship of an employer to his employee
is that of a principal to an agent. 61 Therefore, an employer is clearly
liable under the controlling persons sections of the Acts for the statu-
51. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1976); H.R. Rep. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1933).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1976).
53. See Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35, 41-42 (1oth Cir. 1971); Myzel v.
Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 738 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Jackson
v. Bache & Co., 381 F. Supp. 71, 95 (N.D. Cal. 1974); H.R. Rep. No. 152, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1933); Hearings, supra note 3, at 7022.
54. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
55. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
56. Hearings, supra note 3, at 6571.
57. H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1934).
58. Id.
59. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1976).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1976).
61. Wood v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 508 F.2d 167, 173 (5th Cir. 1975); Raasch v.
Dulany, 273 F. Supp. 1015, 1017 (E.D. Wis. 1967); Restatement (Second) of Agency
§ 2 comment a (1958).
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tory violations of his employees. 62 Moreover, the controlling persons
provisions, with their good faith defense, should be the exclusive basis
for secondary liability in the federal courts. Judicial application of
principles of agency to impose secondary liability on employers for the
securities violations of their employees is a constitutionally infirm act
of creating federal common law.
II. FEDERAL COMMON LAW
An assessment of the propriety of basing secondary liability under
the securities acts on agency principles necessarily entails a discussion
of the doctrine of separation of powers.6 3 Congress is the principal
law-making body of the federal government. 4 Congress exercises
this authority in its enactment of federal statutes.6 s Congress has
expressed its will regarding securities law through enactment of the
1933 Act and the 1934 Act. 66 These Acts provide controlling persons
with specific defenses.6 7 The trend in federal courts to apply agency
theories as well as the statutory sections to determine secondary liabil-
ity68 deprives such persons of those defenses.69 Courts are, therefore,
effectively rewriting the statutes, substituting their own judgment for
that of Congress. Such judicial overreaching eviscerates the control-
ling persons sections and violates the boundaries imposed on the fed-
eral judiciary by the doctrine of separation of powers.7 0
In enforcing statutes, federal courts have a limited competence to
create common law,71 generally referred to as interstitial federal com-
62. See supra notes 5-6, 8 and accompanying text.
63. See National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 590-91
(1949); O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530 (1933); Springer v. Govern-
ment of Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 200-02 (1928); J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co.
v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928). See generally J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J.
Young, Constitutional Law 126-27 (1978); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law
§§ 2-1 to -4 (1978).
64. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Mich., 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1792 (1981); Ten-
nesse Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978); Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum
Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966); Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 663 (1951).
65. See cases cited supra note 64.
66. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbb (1976); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
67. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
68. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
70. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Mich., 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1792 (1981);
Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978); Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625-26 (1978); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546,
565-66 (1963); Note, Federal Common Law and Water Pollution: Statutory Preemp-
tion or Preservation?, 49 Fordham L. Rev. 500, 512-13 (1981).
71. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Mich., 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1790 (1981); Clear-
field Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943); see Republic Steel Corp. v.
Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 657 (1965); Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238, 241
(1962); Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957).
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mon law,72 by means of which courts may fill a gap in a federal
statute.73  The instances in which a federal court may create such
law, however, are few and exceptional.74  The Supreme Court has
recently stated, "[tihe establishment of ... a self-consciously compre-
hensive program by Congress ... strongly suggests that there is no
room for courts to attempt to improve on that program with federal
common law. '175
The securities acts are, unquestionably, a comprehensive scheme of
federal legislation. 7" Therefore, a court must begin its examination of
those acts with the assumption that there are no gaps in the acts, and
any secondary liability under those acts must be determined under
one of the provisions of the acts themselves. Nevertheless, the first
proponents77 of the theory that agency principles may be used in such
actions based their conclusion on their perception of gaps, or "inter-
stices," in the statutes with respect to secondary liability. 7 The court
72. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383, 414 (1964); see City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Mich., 101 S. Ct.
1784, 1795 (1981).
73. See cases cited supra note 71. For example, section 10(b) of the 1934 Act
prescribes no statute of limitations for the bringing of an action under that section.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976). Federal courts have generally filled this gap in the statute
by looking to the statute of limitations prescribed for similar actions by the state In
which the action is brought. E.g., Robertson v. Seidman & Seidman, 609 F.2d 583,
586 (2d Cir. 1979); Fox v. Kane-Miller Corp., 542 F.2d 915, 917 (4th Cir. 1976);
Nickels v. Koehler Management Corp., 541 F.2d 611, 613 (6th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977); Cole v. Alodex Corp., 533 F.2d 372, 373 (8th Cir.
1976) (per curiam); Nortek, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 532 F.2d 1013, 1015 (5th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1042 (1977); Posner v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 972, 982 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
74. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Mich., 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1790-92 (1981);
Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963); see D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v.
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 471-72 (1942); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64, 78 (1938); 1A J. Moore, Federal Practice 0.32,3[1] (1968). Prior to City of
Milwaukee, there was some support for the notion that the use of federal common
law was appropriate in a wide variety of situations despite the general proscription of
Erie that "[t]here is no federal general common law." 304 U.S. at 78 (1938). See J.I.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434 (1964); Textile Workers Union of Am. v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957); SEC Brief, supra note 15, at 19. See
generally C. Wright, Federal Courts 278-86 (1976).
75. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Mich., 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1793 & n.14 (1981)
(emphasis added).
76. Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126, 1132 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 101 S. Ct. 999
(1981); Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1286 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); SEC Brief, supra note 15, at 1.
77. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 297 F. Supp. 1165 (D. Md. 1968), afj'd in
part, rev'd in part, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974);
SEC Brief, supra note 15.
78. The SEC Brief, supra note 15, advanced an explicit interstitial federal com-
mon law argument and determined that there were gaps in the controlling persons
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in SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc. ,' however, imposed agency
liability without resolving the question of the coverage of the control-
ling persons sections.80 Later cases such as Marbury Management,
Inc. v. Kohn8' have not dealt with the question of a statutory gap as a
prerequisite to the use of federal common law. Because these later
cases have failed to identify a gap in the statutes, their application of
federal common law is unwarranted.
No court has dealt with the federal common law issues implicated
by the use of agency principles in securities fraud cases.8 2 The cases
that hold employers liable under agency principles on the premise that
employers are not covered by the controlling persons sections,8 3 how-
ever, mandate a thorough federal common law analysis. If a federal
court were to find ambiguity in the legislative history of these sections,
such ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the assumption that
there is no gap in the statute.84 If a court finds no ambiguity in the
legislative history and concludes that employers are not covered by the
controlling persons sections,85 however, there would, indeed, be such
a gap.
provisions as they did not cover employers. Id. at 19. In Johns Hopkins Univ. v.
Hutton, 297 F. Supp. 1165, 1211-12 & n.27 (D. Md. 1968), affd in part, reod in
part, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974), the court also
concluded that employers were not covered and cited the SEC Brief approvingly.
The Johns Hopkins court thus implicitly adopted the SEC Briefs position regarding
federal common law.
79. 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975).
80. Id. at 812-13.
81. 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1oll (1980); accord, e.g., Paul
F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1118 (5th Cir. 1980);
Holloway v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690, 694-95 (6th Cir. 1976); Fey v. Walston & Co.,
493 F.2d 1036, 1052-53 (7th Cir. 1974); Kravitz v. Pressman, Frohlich & Frost, Inc.,
447 F. Supp. 203, 214 (D. Mass. 1978).
82. It is clear, however, from the language used in the cases, e.g., Could v.
American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 778 (3d Cir. 1976) ("ordinary agency
principles"); Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 259 (4th Cir. 1975) ("familiar princi-
ples"); Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036,1052 (7th Cir. 1974) ("general rules");
Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 457 F. Supp. 879, 890 (E.D. Pa. 1978) ("normal
agency principles"), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981), and
the absence of any discussion of pendent jurisdiction over a state law claim, see, e.g.,
Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111 (5th Cir. 1980);
Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1011 (1980); Holoway v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1976), that, federal
common law is being applied rather than the common law of any particular state.
See Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934, 69
Cal. L. Rev. 80, 86-87 & n.41 (1981).
83. E.g., SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801,812 (2d Cir. 1975);
Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 297 F. Supp. 1165, 1211 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974).
84. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Mich., 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1792-93 & n.14
(1981).
85. See supra note 83.
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Assuming, arguendo, that the securities laws do not deal with
secondary liability of employers, the issue is whether a federal court
has competence to fashion federal common law. The resolution of this
issue depends on whether the federal interest in the litigation is suffi-
cient to warrant the creation of federal common law and the resulting
displacement of any existing state law.86 The sufficiency of a federal
interest is determined by whether a "clear and substantial interest" of
the federal government is threatened with "major damage" by the
application of state law.87 There are no clear judicial guidelines for
determining what constitutes a "clear and substantial interest" or
"major damage" to that interest.8 8 The two factors that the Supreme
Court has looked to in addressing these questions, however, are the
need for uniformity in the area 9 and the degree to which there is
"significant conflict" between state law and a federal policy or inter-
est.9 0
In assessing the sufficiency of a federal interest, a strong presump-
tion exists that displacement of state law is not warranted." In Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins, 92 the Supreme Court recognized that this pre-
sumption in favor of state law is deeply rooted in our federal sys-
tem. 93 The presumption has been recently reinforced by the Supreme
Court in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan,94 where the court
stated that "[i]f state law can be applied, there is no need for federal
common law; if federal common law exists, it is because state law
cannot be used." 9 State law can be used in securities cases. State
common-law actions are specifically preserved by the savings clause
of the securities acts, section 28(a) of the 1934 Act. 0  The
purpose of the securities laws is to regulate conduct in the finan-
cial community.97 The existence of a savings clause indicates that the
drafters of the Acts did not believe that this purpose is in "significant
conflict" with the availability of state common-law actions against
86. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 346, 352 (1966); see United States v.
Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 592-93 (1973); Clearfied Trust Co. v.
United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943); Comment, Rules of Decision in Nondlver-
sity Suits, 69 Yale L.J. 1428 (1960).
87. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966).
88. Note, Choice of Law in Federal Bail Bond Contracts: Protecting Principles of
Federalism, 49 Fordham L. Rev. 133, 145 (1980).
89. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943).
90. Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 31 (1977); Wallis v. Pan Am. Petro-
leum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966).
91. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Mich., 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1792 (1981); see Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
92. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
93. See id. at 78.
94. 101 S. Ct. 1784 (1981).
95. Id. at 1790 n.7.
96. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1976).
97. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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brokerage firms for fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. Furthermore,
it is clear from the inclusion of the savings clause that the drafters did
not believe that any lack of uniformity in state law would inhibit the
purpose of the Acts. Therefore, assuming the absence of secondary
liability for employers under the securities acts, an aggrieved party
may proceed against a brokerage firm only under state lav. 98
Arguably, the application of state law by a federal court in exercise
of pendent jurisdiction over a state claim"" may lead to the same result
as application of federal common law. This situation may give rise to
the assertion that the distinction is procedural rather than substantive.
There are, however, substantive differences between federal securities
laws and the laws of the states -with respect to fraud00 and secondary
98. See, e.g., Henricksen v. Henricksen, 640 F.2d 880, 888 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3462 (U.S. Dec. 8, 1981); Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar &
Co., 382 F.2d 689, 694-95 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968);
Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 503-04, 248 N.E.2d 910, 915-16, 301
N.Y.S.2d 78, 85-86 (1969).
99. The exercise of pendent jurisdiction is a discretionary function of the federal
courts. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 9 (1976); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528,
550 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting); United Mine Workers v. Cibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726
(1966). For an excellent discussion of the problems entailed by common-law fraud
claims pendent to federal securities fraud actions, see Stowell v. Ted S. Finkel Inv.
Servs., Inc., 489 F. Supp. 1209, 1214-16 (S.D. Fla. 1980), aff'd, 641 F.2d 323 (5th
Cir. 1981).
100. When principles of agency and respondeat superior are applied in a state
common-law fraud action, the primary fraud must be proved with clear and con-
vincing evidence. See, e.g., Ridout's-Brown Serv., Inc. v. Holloway, 397 So. 2d 125,
126 (Ala. 1981) (per curiam); Hi-Way Motor Co. v. International Harvester Co., 398
Mich. 330, 336, 247 N.W.2d 813, 816 (1976); LaPuzza v. Prom Town House Motor
Inn, Inc., 191 Neb. 687, 692, 217 N.W.2d 472, 476 (1974); Simcuski v. Saeli, 44
N.Y.2d 442, 453, 377 N.E.2d 713, 719, 406 N.Y.S.2d 259, 265 (1978). Violations of
Rule 10b-5, however, may be established by a preponderance of the evidence.
Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 825 (9th Cir. 1980); Dzenits v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d 168, 171 n.2 (10th Cir. 1974); Fey v.
Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1049 (7th Cir. 1974); Hecht v. Harris, Upham &
Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1209 (9th Cir. 1970); Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth
Edison Co., 451 F. Supp. 602, 607-08 (S.D. I11. 1978), affd, 598 F.2d 1109 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 900 (1979); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 906,
915 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965);
Taylor v. Janigan, 212 F. Supp. 794, 800 (D. Mass. 1962), modified, 344 F.2d 781
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965). But sce Huddleston v. Herman &
MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 546 (5th Cir. 1981). Scienter is an element of a Rule lOb-5
action. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976). In a common-law
action for misrepresentation, however, negligence may suffice. See, e.g., Williams v.
Polgar, 391 Mich. 6, 18-23, 215 N.W.2d 149, 154-57 (1974); McDonald v. Mianecki,
79 N.J. 275, 280, 398 A.2d 1283, 1285 (1979); White v. Guarente, 43 N.Y.2d 356,
362-63, 372 N.E.2d 315, 319, 401 N.Y.S.2d 474, 478 (1977); Rempel v. Nationwide
Life Ins. Co., 471 Pa. 404, 408, 370 A.2d 366, 367-68 (1977). In addition, the state
measure of damages for fraud might vary from the federal measure. Stowell v. Ted S.
Finkel Inv. Servs., Inc., 489 F. Supp. 1209, 1214-16 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (punitive
damages available at state common law but not under 10b-5), affd, 641 F.2d 323
(5th Cir. 1981).
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liability.' 0' In addition, state law in these areas is unsettled 02 and
diverse. 0 3 State law cannot, therefore, be summarily supplanted by
federal common law for purposes of judicial economy or convenience.
Even if a court were to find a federal interest sufficient to justify the
creation of interstitial federal common law, it would have to fashion
101. Thirty-eight jurisdictions have enacted or substantially adopted the Uniform
Securities Act (1956). [1C pt. 1] H. Sowards & N. Hirsch, Blue Sky Beg. (MB) § 1.03
n.13 (Cum. Supp. Dec. 1981) [hereinafter cited as H. Sowards & N. Hirsch). This act
includes a provision for secondary liability which requires scienter after the fashion of
§ 15 of the Securities Act. Uniform Securities Act § 410(2)(b) (1956) (amended 1958).
This provision also contains a savings clause, § 410(h). A number of states, however,
have passed the Uniform Securities Act with this provision deleted. E.g., Idaho Code
§ 30-1446 (1980); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 17-1268 (1974); Mont. Code Ann. § 30-10-307
(1981). See generally [11C pt. 2] H. Sowards & N. Hirsch, supra, § 9,02[3] & nn.
43-44. While Washington has also deleted the savings clause, Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 21.20.430 (1978), case law in that state makes clear that common law is nonetheless
saved. Kittilson v. Ford, 93 Wash. 2d 223, 225, 608 P.2d 264, 265 (1980); see Dunlop
v. Wild, 22 Wash. App. 583, 590 n.4, 591 P.2d 834, 838 n.4 (1979). It is possible that
some states might be as troubled by the evisceration of their statutory secondary
liability provision by resort to common law as federal courts have been. See supra
notes 8-14 and accompanying text.
102. Trostle v. Nimer, 510 F. Supp. 568, 578 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Kerby v. Com-
modity Resources Inc., 395 F. Supp. 786, 790 (D. Colo. 1975); Gordon v. Lipoff, 320
F. Supp. 905, 926 (W.D. Mo. 1970). Federal courts have often held that it is proper
to refrain from exercising pendent jurisdiction over a claim involving an unsettled
area of state law. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 716 (1973); Trostle v.
Nimer, 510 F. Supp. 568, 578 (S.D. Ohio 1981); W.A. Krueger Co. v. Kirkpatrick,
Pettis, Smith, Polian, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 800, 804 (D. Neb. 1979); Aiello v. City of
Wilmington, 426 F. Supp. 1272, 1295 (D. Del. 1976), aff'd, 623 F.2d 845 (3d Cir.
1980); Kerby v. Commodity Resources Inc., 395 F. Supp. 786, 790 (D. Colo. 1975);
Gordon v. Lipoff, 320 F. Supp. 905, 926 (W.D. Mo. 1970). Furthermore, a state
court might refuse to impose common-law secondary liability for a primary offense
unknown at common law: " '[I]f a statute creates a liability unknown to the common
law, . . . the statute will be strictly construed in the sense that it will not be extended
beyond its plain meaning or applied to cases not clearly within its purview.' "Ringo
v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 569 S.W.2d 31, 34 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (quoting Satter-
field v. Satterfield, 448 S.W.2d 456, 459 (Tex. 1969)); see also 2A C. Sands, Suther-
land's Statutes and Statutory Construction § 50.01 n.5 (4th ed. Supp. 1981).
103. States differ to some extent in their formulation of the elements of a cause of
action for fraud. Compare Rice v. McAlister, 268 Or. 125, 128, 519 P.2d 1263, 1265
(1974) (nine elements for fraud), and Markov v. ABC Transfer & Storage Co., 76
Wash. 2d 388, 395, 457 P.2d 535, 539 (1969) (same), with Consolidated Plan of
Conn., Inc. v. Cross, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 641, 642, 239 A.2d 51, 52 (1967) (five
elements), and Proulx v. Hirsch Bros., 279 Minn. 157, 162, 155 N.W.2d 907, 911
(1968) (similar five elements). Also, the statutes of limitation for fraud vary from
state to state. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 338(4) (West 1954) (three years from
discovery); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 213(8) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982) (six years
from discovery); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305.09(C) (Page 1981) (four years from
discovery). It might be argued that a federal court would look to state law for the
statute of limitation for a 10b-5 action. See supra note 73. The statute borrowed,
however, might not be the statute for common-law fraud. See Herm v. Stafford, 455
F. Supp. 650, 653 (W.D. Ky. 1978).
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such common law in a manner consistent with the intent of Congress
in enacting the statute. 0 4  It is clear that Congress was seriously
concerned, in enacting the securities acts, that a party's liability be
related to his fault. This is evident from the good faith defense avail-
able under section 20(a) of the 1934 Act'05 and the scienter require-
ment of section 15 of the 1933 Act.' °0 The "due diligence" defense
available to defendants under the 1933 Act'0 7 further supports this
conclusion. 08 Courts have recognized the appropriateness of relating
liability to fault in their requirements of various degrees of scienter for
various forms of Rule 10b-5 liability. 0 9
There is no good faith defense available to a principal at common
law." 0 The imposition of liability on employers under principles of
agency, therefore, would amount to an imposition of strict liability on
employers,"' contrary to the intent of Congress that liability be re-
lated to fault. If it is determined appropriate to create interstitial
federal common law in this area, provision must be made for a
relation of liability to fault." 2
The courts in Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn"13 and Paul F.
Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank ' 4 advanced one other argu-
ment in support of their imposition of liability under principles of
respondeat superior." 5 The courts reasoned that such a result was
required by section 28(a) of the 1934 Act," 6 which states that all rights
and remedies under the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act shall be in addition
to rights and remedies otherwise available." ' The legislative history
104. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103-04 (1972); United States
v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 492 (1960); Ebert v. Poston, 266 U.S. 548, 554
(1925).
105. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1976); see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1976); see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
107. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (1976).
108. See Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 575-83
(E.D.N.Y. 1971); Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 682-84
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
109. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976); Edwards & Hanly v.
Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d 478, 485 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1045 (1980); Lanza v. Drexel, 479 F.2d 1277, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973); Kohn v.
American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 280 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
874 (1972).
110. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
111. Jackson v. Bache & Co., 381 F. Supp. 71, 95 (N.D. Cal. 1974); SEC v.
Lum's, Inc. 365 F. Supp. 1046, 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); see supra notes 9-14 and
accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
113. 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980).
114. 630 F.2d 1111 (5th Cir. 1980).
115. Id. at 1118; Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 716 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980).
116. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976).
117. Id.
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surrounding this section is unmistakably clear in stating that the
section is intended to preserve only state rights and remedies." 8
Courts have construed the section as primarily intended to preserve
state blue-sky law. 119 Further, a court might assume that section
28(a) was intended to preserve federal common law as the passage of
the Acts antedates the general proscription of federal common law by
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.120 Such an assumption, however, is con-
trary to the presumption recently enunciated by the Supreme Court in
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan 121 that the need for federal
common law no longer exists when a field has been made the subject
of comprehensive federal legislation. 122  A contrary assumption is
applied to state common law, which is presumed to survive the enact-
ment of federal legislation covering an area. 2 3 An action under the
controlling persons provisions of the federal securities acts, however,
is a federal statutory action in which common law concepts, be they
of federal or state origin, have no application.
CONCLUSION
Section 15 of the 1933 Act and section 20(a) of the 1934 Act are the
sole appropriate means by which to impose secondary liability under
the securities acts. Cases that hold to the contrary and impose liability
under principles of agency law go against the plain meaning of both
sections and are in conflict with congressional intent that parties who
are not at fault should have an affirmative defense to liability under
the securities acts. The use of agency principles to determine liability
under the securities laws is an inappropriate creation of federal com-
mon law and runs directly against the principles of the federal Erie
doctrine.
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